A Tiger with No Teeth: The Case for Fee Shifting in State Public Records Law by Hooper, Heath & Davis, Charles N.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 79 
Issue 4 Fall 2014 Article 8 
Fall 2014 
A Tiger with No Teeth: The Case for Fee Shifting in State Public 
Records Law 
Heath Hooper 
Charles N. Davis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Heath Hooper and Charles N. Davis, A Tiger with No Teeth: The Case for Fee Shifting in State Public 
Records Law, 79 MO. L. REV. (2014) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol79/iss4/8 
This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
 A Tiger with No Teeth: The Case for Fee 
Shifting in State Public Records Law 
Heath Hooper* and Charles N. Davis** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A federal lawsuit filed against the city of Columbia, Missouri, alleging 
police brutality seemed destined for headlines in 2010.1  At its core was an 
incident in which a routine traffic stop for a broken taillight erupted into a 
“fracas” in which police allegedly both tased and beat a man and threw a 
woman to the ground.2  A Columbia Daily Tribune reporter following the 
case filed a public records request for any documents concerning the inci-
dent.3  A police spokesperson contacted him days later to let him know the 
records were ready for pickup.4 
But when the reporter came for the records, he was in for quite a sur-
prise: The Columbia Police Officers Association, aware of the public records 
request, had filed a temporary restraining order preventing the release of the 
records.5 
At first glance, the law on the matter seemed fairly clear, but, as the pa-
per would soon find out, appearances can be deceiving.  Though the applica-
ble law was easily identified – the city had adopted an open record ordinance 
a few months earlier – the language in the ordinance and a 2001 Missouri 
Supreme Court decision made the law’s application to these particular cir-
cumstances uncertain.6  The applicable ordinance, Ordinance Section 21-54, 
provides that “all records pertaining to complaints filed against police officers 
alleging misconduct of the police officer shall be open records,” with excep-
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 1. See T.J. Greaney, CPD Incident Results in Court Complaint, COLUM. DAILY 
TRIB. (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.columbiatribune.com/opinion/columnists/cpd-inci-
dent-results-in-court-complaint/article_0fcd65f7-1b0a-55ba-9adc-2ac69a2f20d0.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. T.J. Greaney, Police Group Says Records Law Is Unfair, COLUM. DAILY 
TRIB. (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/local/police-group-says-
records-law-is-unfair/article_f33c94de-e0f3-5f22-8784-b9f920b5d9de.html. 
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tions for those closed by federal or state law and those that disclose the iden-
tity of an undercover officer.7 
A similar issue was before the Supreme Court of Missouri in 2001.  In 
Guyer v. City of Kirkwood, the court held that reports concerning an internal 
investigation into a complaint alleging criminal misconduct by a police of-
ficer are investigative reports, and therefore are public records that cannot be 
closed on the grounds that they are personnel records.8  Columbia Ordinance 
Section 21-54 differs from the Supreme Court of Missouri’s precedent in that 
it does not use the word “criminal.”9  Ultimately, there appeared to be an 
argument for keeping the documents secret, at least according to the Colum-
bia Police Officers Association.10 
 The Daily Tribune, along with its counsel, Missouri Press Associa-
tion (“MPA”) attorney Jean Maneke, had limited options available to them.  
They could head in as an intermediary.  Or, they could let the city and police 
officers decide just how the ordinance applied to state Freedom of Infor-
mation (“FOI”) law. 
Although the Daily Tribune, like other papers across the nation, was 
managing its way through tough economic times, it didn’t relish the prospect 
of a lengthy – and costly – trip through the courts in pursuit of the files.  As 
Tribune Managing Editor Jim Robertson explained: “Unfortunately, we al-
ways have to weigh the potential cost in dollars against principal and the po-
tential harm an adverse ruling could create on a larger scale.  These days, we 
have to choose our battles very carefully.”11 
So the Daily Tribune turned to the National Freedom of Information 
Coalition (“NFOIC”) and its Knight FOI Fund, which provided a grant to 
cover the upfront costs of the FOI litigation.12  That the NFOIC’s Litigation 
Committee could pay up to $10,000 for legal fees soothed some fears as the 
paper made the decision to pursue the records.13  The grant also encouraged 
the participation of the MPA, which took the case pro bono.14 
It took about forty-five minutes for a Boone County judge to determine 
that the law mandated that the documents be released.15  T.J. Greaney, the 
Daily Tribune reporter, now had access to the requested documents and vide-
os, which told the story of the “fracas” through the statements of dozens of 
witnesses.16 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Guyer v. City of Kirkwood, 38 S.W.3d 412, 414-15 (Mo. 2001) (en banc). 
 9. Greaney, supra note 6. 
 10. Charles N. Davis, A New Weapon in Sunshine Battles: The Knight FOI Fund, 
NFOIC (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.nfoic.org/special-sunshine-week-2010. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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The cost?  More than $12,000 – quite a chunk of change for a local dai-
ly.17  Fortunately, the paper had the NFOIC’s support.  The paper only had to 
pay out a far more affordable $2,065.61.18  But for the outside promise of fee 
payment, a vitally important case culminating in public access to the press 
may have never seen the light of day, simply due to a lack of funds to initiate 
litigation. 
The Columbia case underscores one of the systemic weaknesses of state 
FOI laws: most provide little or no incentive for plaintiffs to seek legal re-
dress for even the most blatant violations of the law.  This Article seeks to 
examine the current state of the public records ecosystem and suggests a po-
tential path through fee shifting to balance out the problematic incentives 
inherent in many state laws.  Part II examines the development of fee-shifting 
laws in the United States, while Parts III and IV examine the rise, fall, and 
rise again of a particularly interesting form of fee shifting.  Part V looks at the 
current state of those like Greaney and his compatriots, who man the front 
lines of the open records battlefield.  Finally, the authors suggest a potential 
path, one already taken by federal lawmakers and some state lawmakers, that 
could benefit all involved in the open records field. 
II.  FEE SHIFTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
Civil rights enforcement in the United States has long depended on fee-
shifting legislation.19  This kind of legislation statutorily allows plaintiffs to 
collect attorney’s fees when they prevail in a court case, fostering greater use 
of the statutes to guarantee the rights enshrined in the law.20  Such an ar-
rangement is not the norm in the United States: under the “American Rule” 
each party pays for its respective attorneys’ fees regardless of who wins.21  
The problem with this arrangement is that if someone does not have the mon-
ey to pay for an attorney, that person is less likely to engage in litigation to 
protect constitutional or statutory rights, even when those rights are plainly 
violated.  The resultant lack of citizen-driven litigation in state public records 
and open meetings laws remains a noteworthy weakness in laws that are de-
signed to protect citizen access to governmental proceedings and records. 
Not all countries follow the American Rule.22  Across the pond in Eng-
land, for instance, courts have discretion to award such fees, and often do 
so.23  Only one U.S. state, Alaska,24 has retained the British notion of two-
 
 17. See id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Christopher J. Roederer, Democracy and Tort Law in America: The Counter-
Revolution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 647, 695 (2008). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975). 
 22. Id. at 247. 
 23. Id. (“[F]or centuries in England there has been statutory authorization to 
award costs, including attorneys’ fees.  Although the matter is in the discretion of the 
court, counsel fees are regularly allowed to the prevailing party.”). 
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way, “loser pays” fee shifting.25  Most states and the federal government fol-
low the so-called “private attorney general exception,” which only sometimes 
allows for one-way fee shifting.26  The term “private attorney general” first 
made its appearance on the legal scene in Associated Industries of New York 
v. Ickes.27  The exception, which was based on the notion that private lawyers 
should help enforce public laws, did not originate in that decision, however.28  
Long before Associated Industries, Congress passed legislation that allowed 
federal courts to award attorney’s fees, but that practice had by and large 
ended by the beginning of the nineteenth century.29 
Six rationales have been put forward to justify the continued need for 
fee shifting: 
(1) that the losing litigant should pay the winner’s costs in the interest 
of fairness; (2) that the litigant should be made financially whole for 
the legal wrong suffered; (3) that fee-shifting may have deterrent and 
punitive value; (4) that suits by private attorneys general should be en-
couraged because of their public usefulness; (5) that the relative 
strengths of the parties should be equalized; and (6) that a fee-shifting 
scheme may have desired incentive effects.30 
While the United States has not completely given up on the concept as 
part of the common law,31 the U.S. Supreme Court has decided that, at least 
 
 24. The idea is certainly not without controversy even in that state, see, e.g., 
Alaska S.B. No. 181, 28th Leg. (Alaska 2013), but the notion nonetheless remained 
popular among attorneys in a recent sample.  Nancy Meade, Attorney’s Fee Shifting: 
Perceptions on its Impact in Alaska, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CT. 27 (May 2012), 
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/files/pdf/education%20and%20careers/cedp%20papers/
2012/attorneys%20fee%20shifting.ashx.  According to the study, two-way fee shift-
ing does not seem to be a terribly strong deterrent for weak lawsuits, but might serve 
to encourage settlements.  Id. at 41. 
 25. See id. at 2.  This two-way fee shifting, which was a popular notion in the 
1990s and remains viable today, has come up mostly in the context of tort reform.  
See id. at 15-16. 
 26. William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is – And 
Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2147-48 (2004). 
 27. Id. at 2130 & n.2, 2131 (citing Assoc. Indus. of N.Y. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 
704 (2d Cir. 1943)). 
 28. Id. at 2134. 
 29. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-49 
(1975). 
 30. Alabama v. Pope, No. 08-345, 2008 WL 4678665, at *19 (U.S. Oct. 17, 
2008) (citing Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A 
Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L. J. 651, 653 (1982)). 
 31. See infra Part III. 
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for federal courts, any decisions about such awards belong to the legislative 
branch.32 
Modern fee-shifting statutes were initially intended to promote the pri-
vate enforcement of federal civil rights statutes.33  Generally speaking, such 
statutory exceptions still seek to “encourage actions that benefit public policy 
– either private enforcement actions, as in the area of civil rights litigation 
and environmental legislation, or social policies such as consumer protection 
and equal access to justice.”34  Fee-shifting statutes are generally implement-
ed “to encourage, typically, public interest cases that a plaintiff would not 
otherwise file unless he knew his attorney’s fees would be paid when he 
won.”35  Of course, such provisions can also be punitive in nature.36 
Fee-shifting legislation effectively empowers private plaintiffs to en-
force their rights in court without having to concern themselves with litiga-
tion expenses because attorneys, seeing an opportunity for payment via the 
fee-shifting statutes, are much more likely to take on legitimate cases in ex-
pectation of winning.37  Many states allow fee shifting in public records cas-
es.38  Not all public records laws, however, offer the same protections.39  Le-
gally, dubious deniers of public records under state law are often allowed to 
simply hand over the documents after a lawsuit is filed, suffering little to no 
penalty unless a judicial decision goes against them.40  Nonetheless, the chal-
lenging party still has to pay the start-up costs for the lawsuit, and such costs 
can be prohibitive. 
Perversely, such a situation disincentives challenging open record re-
quest denials while at the same time incentivizing officials to issue denials.  
There is hope, however.  In regimes that recognize the so-called “catalyst 
theory,” a challenger can often recoup the costs of litigation so long as the 
denier changes her position due to the lawsuit, regardless of whether there has 
been some kind of judicial declaration.41  Although such legislation exists on 
a federal level, state coverage is not as secure.42  Yet, as shall be seen, such 
 
 32. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 421 U.S. at 262 (“[T]he circumstances under 
which attorneys’ fees are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in 
making those awards are matters for Congress to determine.”). 
 33. See Ian K. Peterson, When “May” Means “Shall”: The Case for Mandatory 
Liquidated Damages Under the Federal Wiretap Act, 35 STETSON L. REV. 1051, 1082 
(2006). 
 34. Meade, supra note 24, at 12-13. 
 35. Id. at 12. 
 36. Id. at 13. 
 37. See id. at 116. 
 38. Katrina G. Hull, Disappearing Fee Awards and Civil Enforcement of Public 
Records Laws, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 721, 727 (2004). 
 39. See id. at 728. 
 40. See id. at 732. 
 41. Id. at 734. 
 42. As of 2010, the highest courts in Alaska, California, Hawaii, New Jersey, 
and Pennsylvania, and appellate courts in Arizona, Kentucky, and Washington have 
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guarantees are sorely needed in an age of ever-shrinking budgets.  Citizens 
seeking redress for legally dubious denials of access to public records would 
likely find it much easier to initiate litigation, especially in clear-cut cases, if 
costs were eliminated as a factor.  Such a development would surely be a 
great boon to our current system of open government law. 
III.  BUCKHANNON AND THE PREVAILING PARTY 
As noted above, U.S. legislators in the last half-century have started to 
realize the value of fee shifting in limited circumstances.43  The modern 
movement to enact fee-shifting litigation began with the Civil Rights Act of 
196444 and picked up significant steam with the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees 
Act of 1976.45  These acts introduced the notion of a private attorney general 
who steps in to defend citizens’ civil rights, a notion that has been crucial to 
the enforcement of civil rights statutes.46 
Congress saw fit to award such fees to the “prevailing party” in several 
different pieces of public interest legislation, including in the civil rights pro-
visions mentioned above and in legislation such as the Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1975,47 the Fair Housing Act,48 and the Americans with Dis-
ability Act.49  Some states, like California and Illinois, have also employed 
such language in their public interest statutes.50 
This “prevailing party” language was once a great boon for plaintiffs.  
Under the so-called “catalyst theory” of fee shifting, a plaintiff could “obtain 
prevailing party status and therefore trigger statutory fee shifting if the suit is 
the ‘catalyst’ for action by the defendant that moots the suit.”51  So as long as 
a defendant changed its position because of the plaintiff’s suit, attorney’s fees 
 
continued to apply the catalyst doctrine to state law fee-shifting statutes.  Bruce D. 
Ginsburg, “Catalyst Doctrine” Applied to Statute That Awards Damages, N.J. APP. L. 
(Dec. 31, 2010), http://appellatelaw-nj.com/%E2%80%9Ccatalyst-doctrine%E2%80
%9D-applied-to-statute-that-awards-damages/. 
 43. See Meade, supra note 24, at 14. 
 44. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2012). 
 45. Roederer, supra note 19, at 695; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012). 
 46. See Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering 
for a Global Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L. J. 1057, 
1074 (1997). 
 47. 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e) (2012) (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 1973l). 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(b)(2) (2012). 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2012). 
 50. See, e.g., CAL. GOV. CODE. § 6259(d) (West 2014) (“The court shall award 
court costs and reasonable attorney fees to the plaintiff should the plaintiff prevail in 
litigation filed pursuant to this section.”); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/20 (West 
2014) (“A party who prevails in an action to enforce this Act against a government is 
entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs incurred in maintaining the claim or de-
fense.”). 
 51. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 14:4 (4th 
ed. 2002). 
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could be awarded.  Such action disincentivized stalling on the part of the de-
fendant, and encouraged reticent plaintiffs who might have a good case but 
lacked the funds to pay for it.52 
Some commentators have cited the 1970 Eighth Circuit case Parham v. 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company53 as the origin of the catalyst theory.54  
In that case, the court addressed “whether the plaintiff should be awarded 
attorney fees where there was no finding that he personally had been the vic-
tim of discrimination and a finding that the defendant had voluntarily under-
taken policies and practices that would remedy the past discrimination against 
others.”55  Because the “progress” – meaning the voluntary change in defend-
ant’s conduct – in that case came after Parham filed the complaint, the court 
determined the litigation was the “catalyst” that caused the defendant’s 
change of heart, and thus, “Parham performed a valuable public service in 
bringing this action.”56 
As scholar Lucia A. Silecchia points out in a history of the theory, this 
“catalyst” rationale soon became widespread, taken up by all federal courts of 
appeal aside from the Fourth Circuit.57  The U.S. Supreme Court initially 
signaled potential acceptance of the catalyst theory as a legitimate rationale.58  
However, the Court, in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, which interpreted author-
ization of fee awards “whenever . . . appropriate,”59 held that the fee-shifting 
provision “requires the conclusion that some success on the merits be ob-
tained before a party becomes eligible for a fee award.”60  The Court in 
Ruckelshaus determined that “requiring a defendant, completely successful 
on all issues, to pay the unsuccessful plaintiff’s legal fees would be a radical 
departure from long-standing fee-shifting principles adhered to in a wide 
range of contexts.”61  Commentators have noted that subsequent cases, such 
as Farrar v. Hobby,62 demonstrated “the Court’s continuing ambivalence 
toward the recovery of attorney fees when the nature of the victory does not 
 
 52. See Meade, supra note 24, at 3. 
 53. 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970). 
 54. Lucia A. Silecchia, The Catalyst Calamity: Post-Buckhannon Fee-Shifting in 
Environmental Litigation and a Proposal for Congressional Action, 29 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 1, 14 (2004) (citing Joel H. Trotter, Note, The Catalyst Theory of Civil 
Rights Fee Shifting After Farrar v. Hobby, 80 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1433-37 (1994)). 
 55. Id. at 15. 
 56. Parham, 433 F.2d at 429-30. 
 57. Silecchia, supra note 54, at 15. 
 58. See id. at 17-18. 
 59. 463 U.S. 680, 680 (1983). 
 60. Id. at 682.  Silecchia notes that there is a difference of interpretation regard-
ing the “whenever . . . appropriate” standard verses the “prevailing party” standard.  
As she notes, “[p]ost-Buckhannon litigation – particularly environmental litigation – 
interpreting [the “whenever . . . appropriate” standard] has allowed the continued use 
of the catalyst theory.”  Silecchia, supra note 54, at 52-53. 
 61. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 683. 
 62. 506 U.S. 103 (1992). 
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fall squarely within the bounds of a clear and substantial judicial victory.”63  
Silecchia notes that Farrar contained dicta explaining that in order to be a 
“prevailing party,” a “plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment[,] . . . a 
consent decree[,] or a settlement.”64  Silecchia further notes that the Court did 
“not clearly define these terms or articulate whether its list is illustrative or 
exhaustive.”65 
In Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department 
of Health & Human Resources,66 the U.S. Supreme Court put the final nail 
into the catalyst theory as a federal judicial rationale.67  The Court in Buck-
hannon explicitly rejected the catalyst theory for federal courts interpreting 
“prevailing party” language.68  Granting awards under such a theory, accord-
ing to the Court, “allows an award where there is no judicially sanctioned 
change in the legal relationship of the parties,” which ran counter to prior 
Court precedent.69  Instead, the Court held that a party must prevail judicially 
“on the merits of at least some of his claims,” to trigger most federal fee shift-
ing statutes.70 
Ultimately, as the decision has been interpreted, Buckhannon gave rise 
to the idea that the plaintiff who “prevails” only “because the lawsuit brought 
about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct – is not a permissible 
basis for the award of attorney’s fees. . . .  Only a plaintiff who secures a 
judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree is a prevailing par-
ty.”71  As commentators like Silecchia have pointed out, the Court’s holding 
in Buckhannon was significant because it “changed the status quo everywhere 
except in the Fourth Circuit.”72  Buckhannon, which concerned violations of 
the Fair Housing Amendments Act and Americans with Disabilities Act, de-
termined “that a ‘prevailing party’ is one who has been awarded some relief 
by the court.”73  The two categories that qualified for such relief included 
“enforceable judgments on the merits” and “settlement agreements enforced 
through a consent decree,” situations that involved a “court-ordered ‘chang[e] 
[in] the legal relationship between [the plaintiff] and the defendant.’”74  Ulti-
 
 63. Silecchia, supra note 54, at 30. 
 64. Id. at 30 (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 65. Id. 
 66. 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 
 67. Silecchia, supra note 54, at 2. 
 68. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605, 610. 
 69. Id. at 605 (“Our precedents thus counsel against holding that the term ‘pre-
vailing party’ authorizes an award of attorney’s fees without a corresponding altera-
tion in the legal relationship of the parties.” (emphasis in original)). 
 70. Id. at 603. 
 71. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 51. 
 72. Silecchia, supra note 54, at 35. 
 73. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603. 
 74. Id. at 604 (alterations in original) (quoting Tex. Teachers Ass’n. v. Garland 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989)). 
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mately, the relief must be of a kind “that changed the formal legal relation-
ship between plaintiff and defendant.”75 
Not included, as Silecchia points out, were “(1) cases in which ‘the 
plaintiff has secured the reversal of a directed verdict;’ (2) cases in which the 
plaintiff has ‘acquired a judicial pronouncement that the defendant has violat-
ed the Constitution unaccompanied by judicial relief;’ and (3) cases in which 
there was a ‘nonjudicial alteration of actual circumstances.’”76 
Silecchia further notes that the Buckhannon majority: 
Dismissed as “speculative” and “unsupported by any empirical evi-
dence” arguments that the catalyst theory would be necessary “to pre-
vent defendants from unilaterally mooting an action before judgment 
in order to avoid an award of attorney’s fees” or to avoid “deter[ring] 
plaintiffs with meritorious but expensive cases from bringing suit.”  
The Court did not claim that rejecting the catalyst theory would never 
affect litigation behavior in either of these ways.  However, it did not 
base its judgment on these predicted outcomes.77 
Since Buckhannon, some lower courts have been creative in looking for 
ways to get around the ruling, often “search[ing] the facts of the individual 
cases diligently, looking for something that could be construed as a judicial 
imprimatur.”78  So long as a court can find a judicial remedy of some sort, it 
can get around Buckhannon while still avoiding invoking the forbidden cata-
lyst theory.79 
Interestingly, after Buckhannon, Congress saw fit to explicitly include 
the ability to invoke the catalyst theory in federal Freedom of Information 
Act (“FOIA”) cases via the OPEN Government Act of 2007.80  Congress, 
through OPEN, amended the substantially prevailing standard to “preclude[] 
the use of Buckhannon in determining whether a party is eligible for an award 
of attorney’s fees in a FOIA case and extinguish[] the need for a court to find 
a judicial imprimatur before awarding attorney’s fees when a defendant’s 
 
 75. Silecchia, supra note 54, at 36-37. 
 76. Id. at 37 (citations omitted). 
 77. Id. at 37-38 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608). 
 78. Id. at 50. 
 79. Id. at 48-50. 
 80. OPEN Gov. Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 4, 121 Stat. 2524, 2525 
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)); S. REP. NO. 110-59, at 6 (2007); Justin B. 
Cox, Maximizing Information’s Freedom: The Nuts, Bolts, and Levers of FOIA, 13 
N.Y. CITY L. REV. 387, 424 n.26 (2010) (quoting 153 CONG. REC. S15701-04 (daily 
ed. Dec. 14, 2007) (statement of Sen. Leahy)) (“[This section of the bill is intended] 
to clarify that a complainant has substantially prevailed in a FOIA lawsuit, and is 
eligible to recover attorney fees . . . if the pursuit of a claim was the catalyst for the 
voluntary or unilateral change in position by the opposing party.”). 
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conduct voluntarily changes.”81  The amended standard allows relief when 
there is “a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if the 
complainant’s claim is not insubstantial.”82  Courts have found the amend-
ment: 
essentially codifies the so-called “catalyst theory” for determining a 
fee request against the United States, under which a plaintiff is 
deemed to have “substantially prevailed” for purposes of § 
552(a)(4)(E) if the “litigation substantially caused the requested rec-
ords to be released.”83 
Under the amended FOIA, a “plaintiff must first ‘prove that prosecution 
of the action could reasonably be regarded as necessary to obtain the infor-
mation and that a causal nexus exists between that action and the agency’s 
surrender of that information.’”84  That documents were released just because 
someone filed a complaint, however, would not be enough to justify fees.85  
Instead, “[c]ourts must look to a variety of factors, including the demands of 
the search, agency backlog of FOIA requests, and plaintiff’s attempts to re-
solve the issue out of court.”86  Even after finding that the plaintiff qualifies 
for the fees, the court must then make another assessment to determine 
“whether a plaintiff is entitled to such fees, as the award of such fees is dis-
cretionary.”87  Four factors go into this assessment – none of them singularly 
dispositive: “(1) the public benefit derived from the case; (2) the commercial 
benefit to the [plaintiff]; (3) the nature of the [plaintiff’s] interest in the rec-
ords sought; and (4) whether the government’s withholding had a reasonable 
basis in law.”88 
The Buckhannon ruling, which affected the FOIA fee-shifting provi-
sions at the time, caused no little amount of concern.  As one commentator 
put it: 
[I]f Buckhannon were extended to FOIA fees, government defendants 
could moot virtually all FOIA claims on the eve of judgment and deny 
compensation to successful plaintiffs’ attorneys.  Under such an ar-
 
 81. JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 8:109 (West 
Group 2000). 
 82. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 08-2133, 2009 WL 
1743757, at *3 (D.D.C. June 15, 2009) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii) (2006)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 83. Id. (quoting N.Y.C. Apparel F.Z.E. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. Bureau, 
563 F. Supp. 2d 217, 221 (D.D.C. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 84. Id. (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 562 F. Supp. 2d 
159, 173 (D.D.C. 2008)). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 173). 
 87. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)). 
 88. Id. at *3-4 (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). 
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rangement, only parties capable of risking litigating without compen-
sation would be able to enforce FOIA against intransigent government 
agencies.  Furthermore, even in those cases, agencies would be able to 
prolong the litigation without fear of paying costs for their opponents.  
These bars to access, expediency, and enforceability directly contra-
vene the purposes of amendments to FOIA and . . . would greatly di-
minish FOIA’s value for public interest actions – the very claims that 
FOIA fees promote.89 
Ultimately, it appears federal FOI laws escaped Buckhannon’s aftermath 
relatively unscathed.  Fee-shifting legislation has long been crucial to the 
enforcement of First Amendment freedoms, and that remains the case.  In-
deed, Congress recently introduced legislation containing such fee-shifting 
language to ensure that First Amendment press and speech rights remain safe 
from international “libel tourism” practices following the advent of the Inter-
net Age.90 
State legislatures and courts, however, have not necessarily followed 
suit.91  As discussed in the following section, much work remains to be done 
to ensure that the pursuit of access remains viable for all citizens, regardless 
of their means. 
IV.  FEE SHIFTING AND OPEN RECORDS LAWS AT THE STATE LEVEL 
States have long used the idea of fee shifting to ensure press and speech 
freedoms to varying degrees.92  Shortly after the Buckhannon ruling came 
down, six states had no explicit fee-shifting provisions for public records 
inquiries,93 sixteen states and the District of Columbia allowed for discretion-
ary awards,94 and ten states allowed “semi-discretionary” awards, which are 
“automatically triggered by certain discretionary conditions, such as if the 
information was withheld without a reasonable basis in the law.”95  Such 
awards often allow for “good faith” exceptions to the fee-shifting rule, ren-
 
 89. David J. Arkush, Note, Preserving “Catalyst” Attorney’s Fees Under the 
Freedom of Information Act in the Wake of Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. 
West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 131, 138 (2002). 
 90. See 28 U.S.C. § 4105 (2012); ALAN M. AHART, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE 
GUIDE: ENFORCING JUDGMENTS AND DEBTS, 6J-5 (Rutter Group 2014). 
 91. See, e.g., Hull, supra note 38, at 722-23. 
 92. See, e.g., id. at 746-47 (“All the statutes include either that a court ‘shall’ or 
‘must’ award attorney fees, or that a plaintiff is ‘entitled to’ attorney fees, when the 
plaintiff prevails in a public records lawsuit.”). 
 93. Hull, supra note 38, at 727. 
 94. Id. at 737-38. 
 95. Id. at 743. 
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dering confidence in such awards less than absolute.96  Mandatory fees for 
parties that successfully litigated access issues existed in sixteen states.97 
Of course, states don’t necessarily have to follow federal courts’ ration-
ales when interpreting their own statutes, and indeed, some states have cho-
sen a different interpretation of the “catalyst theory.”  In California, for in-
stance, the “law continues to recognize the catalyst theory and does not re-
quire ‘a judicially recognized change in the legal relationship between the 
parties’ as a prerequisite for obtaining attorney fees under [the civil fee-
shifting statute].”98  Instead, 
to obtain attorney fees without such a judicially recognized change in 
the legal relationship between the parties, a plaintiff must establish 
that (1) the lawsuit was a catalyst motivating the defendants to provide 
the primary relief sought; (2) that the lawsuit had merit and achieved 
its catalytic effect by threat of victory, not by dint of nuisance and 
threat of expense . . . ; and, (3) that the plaintiffs reasonably attempted 
to settle the litigation prior to filing the lawsuit.99 
California courts also disallow fees when a lawsuit merely expedites the 
issuance of regulations.100  They do so to avoid public entities delaying nec-
essary regulations.101  The fear is that the entities will hold off on new regula-
tions so that they do not appear to have introduced the regulations because of 
the lawsuit in question.102  So long as “the process of issuing those regula-
tions or undertaking those measures was ongoing at the time the litigation 
was filed,” government agencies retain discretion as to when to introduce the 
regulations in question.103  If “a government agency is given discretion as to 
the timing of performing some action, the fact that a lawsuit may accelerate 
that performance does not by itself establish eligibility for attorney fees.”104 
Still, the path forward can be a rocky one.  A pair of recent Illinois cases 
demonstrates the confusion litigants face when seeking redress for illegiti-
mate public records denials.  In Rock River Times v. Rockford Public School 
District 205, the Illinois Court of Appeals for the Second District denied a 
newspaper’s request for attorney’s fees under the state’s “prevailing party” 
standard for FOI request fee shifting.105  Rock River Times concerned a news-
paper’s request for a “rebuttal letter” from a former principal regarding the 
 
 96. Id. at 743-44. 
 97. Id. at 746. 
 98. Tipton-Whittingham v. City of L.A., 101 P.3d 174, 177 (Cal. 2004). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. 977 N.E.2d 1216, 1227 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). 
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reasons the principal left his job.106  The school notified the reporter that it 
planned to deny the request based on two exemptions to the state FOI law.107 
After more than a month of wrangling and exemption denials by the 
Public Access Counselor, who served as a check on the school’s claims,108 
the school claimed a third exemption.109  Rather than continue to wait, the 
newspaper filed suit.110  Twenty-two days later, the school turned the letter 
over and successfully moved to have the newspaper’s case dismissed as 
moot.111  The newspaper then unsuccessfully requested that the court award it 
attorney’s fees. 
The lower court denied the request due to the legislature’s removal of 
the word “substantially” from the state FOI statute.  As the reviewing court 
wrote: 
While past case law made clear that the phrase “substantially prevails” 
was broad enough to encompass a plaintiff who had succeeded with-
out court involvement (i.e., the catalyst theory), the legislature was 
presumably aware of these cases and intended the deletion of the word 
“substantially” to effect a change in the law.  The court reasoned that, 
because the newspaper had not achieved “judicially sanctioned relief,” 
it had not prevailed in the instant action and thus was not entitled to 
attorney fees.112 
The state appellate court agreed, finding that the removal of “substan-
tially” narrowed the conditions under which attorney’s fees must be award-
ed.113  The court found it significant that the state legislature chose not to 
track the 2007 Federal FOIA amendment, which used the “substantially pre-
vail” language.114  Ultimately: 
By deleting the word “substantially,” which modified the verb “pre-
vail,” the legislature evinced an intent to require nothing less than 
court-ordered relief in order for a party to be entitled to attorney fees 
under the FOIA.  Because the school released the rebuttal letter before 
 
 106. Id. at 1219. 
 107. Id. at 1220. 
 108. The Public Access Counselor (“PAC”) is “a permanent part of the Office of 
the Attorney General[,] [who works] under the direction and supervision of the Attor-
ney General and with a team of attorneys and professional staff . . . to help people 
obtain public documents and access public meetings.”  Ensuring Open and Honest 
Government, ILL. ATT’Y GENERAL, http://foia.ilattorneygeneral.net/ (last visited Nov. 
28, 2014).  Part of the PAC’s duties include issuing “advisory opinions on FOIA and 
OMA [the Open Meetings Act] in response to requests by public bodies.”  Id. 
 109. Rock River Times, 977 N.E.2d at 1219-20. 
 110. Id. at 1220. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1222. 
 113. Id. at 1226-27. 
 114. Id. at 1226. 
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the court ordered any relief in this case, the newspaper was not a “pre-
vailing party” as contemplated by the FOIA.115 
However, another Illinois appellate court disagreed with the Second 
District’s reasoning.  Uptown People’s Law Center v. Department of Correc-
tions, concerned a January 4, 2012, complaint against the Illinois Department 
of Corrections (“IDOC”) for the IDOC’s non-response to a request for rec-
ords “relating to prison conditions, facility maintenance and sanitation re-
ports.”116  The requests for the reports ran back as far as 2011 and were not 
granted until a year later.117  Uptown requested attorney’s fees, but IDOC, 
citing Rock River Times, “argued that Uptown had not prevailed because all 
requested documents were tendered before litigation concluded.”118  The trial 
court denied the fees request “because the IDOC tendered the documents of 
its own accord without an order by the court.”119 
The Fourth District starkly disagreed with the Second District decision, 
stating that: 
While we agree with the Second District that “substantially prevails” 
was modified to “prevails” to deliberately effectuate a change, we find 
the modification was intended to ensure that successful plaintiffs 
could obtain attorney fees regardless of the extent to which they had 
prevailed, no matter how slight.  Thus, if a plaintiff files a FOIA ac-
tion with respect to five documents and is successful with respect to 
only one, the plaintiff is entitled to the attorney fees incurred with re-
spect to that document, despite having failed with respect to the re-
maining four.  We find the removal of the word “substantially” was 
intended to increase the instances in which a plaintiff obtains attorney 
fees after receiving a requested document, not to decrease those in-
stances.  In addition, having incorporated the broader term “prevail,” 
the Illinois legislature would have no reason to adopt the definition of 
the federal FOIA’s more narrow language, “substantially pre-
vailed.”120 
The decision left significant “uncertainty” for Illinois FOIA litigants, 
with local commentators noting the need for the state’s supreme court to 
weigh in on the issue.121  Such clarity is sorely needed, in Illinois and else-
 
 115. Id. at 1227. 
 116. 7 N.E.3d 102, 103 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 108. 
 121. Timothy J. Clifton, Uncertainty Regarding Attorney’s Fees for FOIA Re-
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where.  As discussed in the next section, properly drafted fee-shifting legisla-
tion could greatly benefit a news industry in dire need of the help. 
V.  THE ISSUES FACING NEWSPAPERS122 
Recent surveys of newspaper editors have noted that open records re-
quests were a fairly common practice and appear to be on the rise, despite the 
fact that resources for litigation are stagnant or falling for many news organi-
zations.  The question remains, however, as to how many of these initial re-
quests are completed, and if not, how many are challenged legally. 
In an open-ended question to a 2009 survey123 by the authors, respond-
ents who indicated a rise in record requests were asked to identify the factors 
they attributed to the shift.  Many stated routine circumstances for increases, 
citing either a specific open-records heavy investigation that resulted in a 
number of requests or a new aggressive editorial hire.  Others attributed in-
creases to the enactment of liberal open records statutes. 
Still, a few respondents cited increasing stonewalling on the part of offi-
cials, with responses ranging from “[d]ifficulty in getting routine information 
from city government” to a “[s]ecretive government.”  One respondent was 
concerned about “[a] number of ‘closed-door’ deals,” and stated a belief that 
“there is more the government is doing – and trying to keep it out of the pub-
lic’s view.”  Others, however, disagreed, chalking up the increases to circum-
stance: “[There are m]ore issues arising, but only by chance.  I see no change 
in government responsiveness.” 
 
 122. The majority of the information in this section comes from a survey conduct-
ed by the authors explained infra, at note 123, unless otherwise noted. 
 123. The survey instrument, available from the authors, was designed by the au-
thors and fellow scholar Dr. Michael Martinez, in consultation with journalism educa-
tors, graduate students, and industry professionals.  The instrument employed open-
ended questions, specific questions, yes/no responses, and questions that required a 
response on a 5-, 6- or 7-point scale.  The survey was administered during the second 
half of 2009 using the SurveyMonkey web-based survey tool, a link to which was 
sent out via an email burst using the email database of the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors.  The database was chosen because it allowed researchers the 
broadest respondent reach possible.  A cover letter explaining the survey and its pur-
poses accompanied the link.  One follow-up email in the months following the initial 
burst re-alerted non-respondents to the survey.  There were 122 respondents to the 
survey, of whom 102 completed the survey.  Of those who identified their position, 
respondents ranged from desk editors to publishers and general managers.  The ma-
jority of respondents (61.3%) worked at papers that had a circulation of 35,000 or 
less.  Just under 10% (9.4%) worked at papers with circulations from 35,001 to 
50,000, while just over 11% (11.3%) worked at papers with circulations from 50,001 
to 75,000.  Over 7% (7.5%) worked at papers with circulations from 75,001 to 
100,000, and about 10% (10.4%) worked at papers with a circulation larger than 
100,000.  Papers in thirty-three states sent responses.  The survey can be viewed 
online at the following link: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=dU1mgSblz
6u_2bYJSR4WD9CA_3d_3d (last visited Dec. 7, 2014). 
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At papers where open government requests declined, the reasoning 
wasn’t necessarily favorable to government responsiveness.  Unsurprisingly, 
budget tightening was cited as a reason for decline.  “We have fewer report-
ers,” said one respondent.  “Less staff available to cover issues has led to less 
issues being covered,” said another. 
Respondents were also asked later in the survey for a specific circum-
stance from their newsrooms that illustrated how the open government land-
scape has changed in recent years.  The responses ranged from hopefulness 
about new state laws and public education efforts to concerns about smaller 
newsroom staffs.  As one respondent described his experience: 
There are fewer reporters to hold public agencies accountable, and 
many of those agencies stall or inflate fees.  I[t] took me personally 13 
months to gather all the names, titles and salaries of 18,000 local gov-
ernment workers in our circulation area.  I had to threaten to sue sev-
eral times. 
A pattern similar to that of submitted requests emerged when respond-
ents were asked about the number of requests that had been turned down over 
the past two years.  Only about five percent of respondents saw a decrease.124  
Likewise, the perceived number of open records violations rose over the past 
two years.  Almost half of respondents stated that, in their opinion, violations 
had increased,125 while about one-third felt violations had stayed about the 
same.126  Less than five percent of respondents believed violations had de-
creased.127 
Respondents were again asked to write about what factors they felt con-
tributed to any shift.  Some of the respondents attributed the increase in re-
fusals to more aggressive reporting.128  Several respondents cited simple ig-
norance or a lack of understanding of the law for increases in denials, while 
 
 124. This figure includes those respondents who reported a slight decrease (4.5%) 
and those who reported a substantial decrease (0.9%).  Furthermore, 9% of respond-
ents stated they either had no opinion on the subject (0.9%), or did not know if the 
number of turned-down requests had increased or decreased (8.1%). 
 125. A total of 49.5% of respondents perceived an increase in open records viola-
tions, with 11.2% reporting a substantial increase and 38.3% reporting a slight in-
crease. 
 126. The number of respondents reporting no real change in open records viola-
tions was just above one-third at 37.4%. 
 127. A total of 4.7% reported that they perceived a decrease in open records viola-
tions over the past two years, with 2.8% reporting a slight decrease, and 1.9% report-
ing a substantial decrease. 
 128. “We are asking more often and public officials are testing the boundaries 
(not to mention our willingness to take them to court),” stated one. 
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others acknowledged there might be purposeful stonewalling.129  One re-
spondent said the economy was hurting those on both sides of the issue.130 
Respondents were split on a question regarding government officials’ 
understanding of and voluntary compliance with open records violations.  
About one-third stated understanding and compliance stayed about the same.  
Another one-third believed it increased,131 while the final one-third believed 
it had decreased.132 
A majority of respondents said legal resources available to reporters for 
open government purposes had not changed over the previous two years.  
Almost one-quarter of respondents stated available resources had de-
creased,133 while fewer than ten percent of respondents said legal resources 
had increased over the past two years.134  Litigation also remained unchanged 
for the majority of respondents, with sixty percent of respondents stating the 
number of times they had sued stayed the same.  Roughly fourteen percent 
stated that litigation by their organization on open government requests 
rose,135 while a similar number stated litigation decreased.136 
The majority (61.3%) of respondents had no specific budget for open 
government litigation, while about twenty-two percent (21.7%) did budget for 
such litigation.  For those with no budget, more than forty percent said their 
newspaper would definitely provide legal support for an open records request.  
For those less sure, almost half said funding for such litigation would be de-
cided on a case-by-case basis.  Only about three percent (3.1%) of respond-
ents did not think their organization would provide legal services, while just 
over six percent did not know whether their paper would provide legal sup-
port. 
Interestingly, the economy does not appear to be dissuading editors from 
pursuing their requests.  More than half of the editors who responded said the 
cost of litigation has never factored into their decision to pursue open gov-
ernment litigation.  If respondents indicated that concerns over the cost of 
 
 129. According to one respondent, “In some cases people simply don’t understand 
the law.  In others, there’s a disregard for the law.” 
 130. “Cutbacks in all levels of government means more difficulty in getting cop-
ies of documents, hiring inexperienced staff, staff doing jobs with which they are 
unfamiliar and unfamiliarity with inspection of public records laws.” 
 131. A total of 29.5% believed it increased, with 25.7% noting a slight increase 
and 3.8% noting a substantial increase. 
 132. Just under one-third of respondents, 28.6%, believed that it had decreased, 
with 23.8% reporting a slight decrease and 4.8% reporting a substantial decrease. 
 133. A total of 24.3% reported a decrease in available resources, with 16.8% re-
porting a slight decrease, and 7.5% reporting a substantial decrease. 
 134. A total of 6.5% of survey respondents indicated a slight increase, while 2.8% 
indicated a substantial increase. 
 135. A total of 13.3% of survey respondents indicated a slight increase, while 
1.0% indicated a substantial increase. 
 136. A total of 8.6% of survey respondents indicated a slight decrease, while 5.7% 
indicated a substantial decrease. 
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litigation had factored into a discussion to pursue an open government act, 
they were asked to describe the situation and its tipping point.  Some were 
specific.  For example, one respondent provided, “Brief was $1500.  Court 
appearances (by phone) took us to $6500 and $20,000 more for an appeal on 
a narrow ruling wasn’t worth losing a reporter position over!” 
Some said they were now more likely to try non-legal methods before 
pursuing litigation, while others said they now took more factors into consid-
eration.  One respondent stated: 
We are much more likely now to consider up front our chances of 
winning and the likelihood that we will end up in costly litigation than 
we were in the past.  This does not always preclude going after rec-
ords and violations, but it is more of a factor because of budget cuts 
and downsizing.  There are many examples – this is a daily ongoing 
conversation.  That said, we may try to be strategic, but we don’t shy 
from fighting. 
Another respondent indicated that setting a bad precedent was a major 
factor in whether they would pursue litigation: “[The p]rimary issue is the 
likelihood that we would win – we would not want to establish ‘bad law’ with 
a loss.” 
Respondents who felt there had been a significant change in the number 
of open government matters their paper had pursued over the prior two years 
were invited to state the factors they felt primarily attributed to the change.  
Aggressive reporting, new laws and governmental ignorance were again cited 
as large factors, but some said a lack of newsroom resources played a part in 
the shift.  “Local government is reacting to the economic pressures facing 
newspapers by being less transparent,” wrote one respondent.  “The single, 
largest factor is that we have fewer available reporters, because of layoffs,” 
wrote another. 
A 2013 survey by the National Freedom of Information Coalition 
(“NFOIC”) and the Media Law Resource Center (“MLRC”) painted a similar 
picture.137  That survey, “of leaders of NFOIC member organizations and 
members of MLRC’s Defense Counsel Section, suggest[ed] there is a greater 
inclination among government officials for gaming the system than comply-
ing with existing disclosure and accountability laws.”138 
VI.  DISCUSSION 
The economic problems facing the news industry have certainly affected 
news organizations, but they clearly have not stopped those organizations 
 
 137. See Amaris Elliott-Engel, 2013 NFOIC/MLRC Open Government Survey 
Showed Troubling Trends for Transparency, NAT’L FREEDOM INFO. COALITION (Dec. 
12, 2013, 3:30 PM), http://www.nfoic.org/2013-nfoic-mlrc-open-government-survey-
showed-troubling-trends-transparency. 
 138. Id. 
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from filing open records requests.  However, while opposition to such re-
quests appears to be on the rise, funds for such litigation are often less forth-
coming. 
Newspaper editors may say that their newsroom policy regarding open 
records litigation has not been affected by the economy, but factors far be-
yond individual newsroom budgets remain in play.  Newspapers, once the 
bastions of truth-tellers charging out as stand-ins for the masses, have been 
handicapped to a large degree by a troubled industry and economic expecta-
tions that are simply no longer realistic.139  Survey respondents clearly indi-
cated that budget restrictions are a large part of the problem.  Government 
budgets around the country have been slashed.  Adding to the already diffi-
cult situation, some officials express outright hostility at the idea of openness. 
Short of public funding for newsrooms, little can be done from the out-
side regarding internal budget problems.  This does not mean, however, that 
nothing can be done about the financial factor.  Despite the fact that the ma-
jority of editors say the cost of litigation is not a factor in pursuing open rec-
ords requests, it seems reasonable to think that the pursuit of such litigation 
would increase if the cost calculus was changed in their favor. 
While recently instituted programs like alternative dispute resolution op-
tions and Public Access Counselors help, it is clear that more is needed.  In-
suring that state governments enshrine catalyst theory protections for litigants 
in their FOI statutes could go a long way toward easing the financial burden 
many newsrooms face when considering FOI litigation.  Although some 
states have certainly made efforts to do so, as demonstrated by the Illinois 
decisions mentioned above, too often the protections are too vague and per-
missive to be of much comfort to reporters. 
Of course, the cost of litigation would cease to be a factor if officials 
would just hand over documents without a fight.  As the survey indicates, 
several editors believe that erroneous denials of record requests stem not from 
a conspiracy to hide information but from simple ignorance of open records 
law.  As the responses indicate, cutbacks often result in uninformed public 
servants examining unfamiliar documents, with the ultimate outcome being 
that the worker denies the request out of fear and in hope that such a denial 
will be sufficient. 
Thus, there is a curious disincentive at work in states where catalyst the-
ory is not recognized.  Other than the threat of a lawsuit, public employees 
have little to lose when they withhold documents.  Further, public officials 
may often simply be unaware of the laws they break.  However, due to vari-
ous factors – including an already significant workload – non-mandated train-
ing efforts often fall flat.140 
 
 139. See Leonard Downie Jr. & Michael Schudson, The Reconstruction of Ameri-
can Journalism, COLUM. J. REV. (Oct. 19, 2009, 1:00 PM), http://www.cjr.org/
reconstruction/the_reconstruction_of_american.php, for a great analysis of this shift. 
 140. See, e.g., Ric Anderson, Column: Open Government Event Underscores 
Need for Education, TOPEKA CAP. J. (June 29, 2009, 9:28 PM), http://cjonline.com/
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Government entities also often have little to lose when they fail to 
properly educate their employees.  Should a case appear to not be going their 
way, they can simply turn over the documents some time before the real liti-
gation starts, confident that their costs will be relatively minimal.141  By disal-
lowing this practice, states that recognize the catalyst theory encourage legis-
lative and regulatory practices that promote adherence to FOI laws, further 
ensuring the proper training of public workers, which would likely go a long 
way toward eliminating the need to resort to litigation for open records en-
forcement. 
Meaningful, mandated education on open records for public employees 
would be beneficial to both parties.  Litigation pulls resources from cash-
strapped government agencies just as it does from newspapers.  An increase 
in open records violations, as indicated by the survey data, creates a ripple 
effect, taking up time and money on not only litigation, but also non-litigation 
processes such as appeals.  All of these processes require both time and mon-
ey that could be better spent elsewhere and create problems that could easily 
be avoided if officials were incentivized to better understand their role and 
the law. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Faced with increasing demands for their time, reporters often have little 
time to pursue denied open records requests, regardless of how egregious the 
denial or how flimsy the excuse for non-compliance.  Likewise, public offi-
cials, receiving little training and mixed messages about government open 
records policy, have little incentive to comply with open records requests.  
The inevitable decline in news media-fueled FOI litigation occasioned by the 
economic downturn and the wrenching economic transformation of print me-
dia has not escaped the notice of governments large and small.  The conflu-
ence of these circumstances results in a precarious situation, not only for re-
porters, but also for the general citizenry and the officials that serve it.  Edi-
tors around the country, despite their best efforts to put an optimistic face on 
the situation, admit that there is an increasing open records problem. 
With little hope for an economic improvement to alleviate the situation, 
other avenues must be pursued.  New classes of FOI litigants must fill the 
breach, or state public records laws risk falling into disrepair.  A healthy 
drumbeat of legal challenges – especially challenges to denials of public rec-
ords requests – brings clarity to the law and serves an important educative 
effect for all involved with open government law. 
Widespread application of the catalyst theory to FOI litigation is one 
such promising avenue.  Such a change could lead to increased education for 
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ment’s dedication to the idea of openness while also reducing potential liabil-
ity.  Such a change benefits officials both on a public relations and budget 
level, as citizens will likely have greater trust in a government they believe is 
dedicated to transparency. 
Recognition of the catalyst theory in FOI cases helps ensure that such a 
policy remains in place.  It does so by handing both news outlets and con-
cerned citizens an effective stick to enforce the policy.  Fee-shifting statutes 
have long been an important tool in the enforcement of civil rights.  Such 
statutes could go a long way in alleviating some of the budgetary concerns of 
newsrooms that wish to pursue wrongfully denied requests.  Likewise, such 
statutes would benefit the government by ensuring that frivolous lawsuits 
against proper denials remain scarce, as the financial incentive to pursue such 
suits exists only if such claims are valid. 
Given the precarious economic situation facing the news industry, the 
costly pursuit of government records could easily get lost in the shuffle.  With 
fewer financial resources available to news outlets, it seems inevitable that 
the ability to pursue open government will be harmed.  As suggested, howev-
er, such harms may be decreased, if not avoided altogether, with proper legis-
lative action.  Fee shifting and the recognition of the catalyst theory could 
offer hope to the private litigant and encourage a new class of participants in 
enforcement of the promises made by public records laws. 
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